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ANY policy makers and academics contend that foreign direct investment





addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, FDI can be a source of valuable
technology and know-how while fostering linkages with local firms, which can help
jump-start an economy. Over the last decades, developed countries as well as developing
ones have increasingly offered incentives to attract foreign firms to their economies.
Recently, the special merits of FDI and the incentives offered to foreign firms
have begun to be questioned. Fuelling this debate is the fact that the empirical
evidence for FDI generating positive effects for host countries is ambiguous at




 In a survey of the literature, Hanson (2001) argues
that there is weak evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for host
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 The vast literature on foreign direct investment and multinational corporations has been surveyed
many times. See Blomström and Kokko (1998), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Lipsey (2002),
Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004), and Alfaro and Rodríguez (2004) for surveys of spillover
channels and empirical findings. A multinational enterprise (MNE) is a firm that owns and controls
production facilities or other income-generating assets in at least two countries. When a foreign
investor begins a greenfield operation (i.e. constructs new production facilities) or acquires control
of an existing local firm, that investment is regarded as a direct investment in the balance of payments
statistics. An investment tends to be classified as direct if a foreign investor holds at least 10 per cent
of a local firm’s equity. This arbitrary threshold is meant to reflect the notion that large stockholders,
even if they do not hold a majority stake, will have a strong say in a company’s decisions and
participate in and influence its management. Hence, to create, acquire or expand a foreign subsidiary,




 For example, whereas positive effects of FDI spillovers were reported as part of Caves’ (1974) pioneering
work in Australia and by Kokko (1994) in Mexico, Haddad and Harrison’s (1993) findings in Morocco,
and Aitken and Harrison’s (1999) findings in Venezuela do not support the spillover hypothesis. See
Alfaro et al. (2004) and Carkovic and Levine (2005) for evidence on elusive gains of FDI at the macro level.
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countries. In a review of the micro-level analysis literature on spillovers from
foreign to domestically owned firms, Görg and Greenaway (2004) conclude that
the effects are mostly negative. Surveying the macro-level empirical research,
Lipsey (2002) notes there is no consistent relation between the size of inward
FDI stocks or flows and GDP or growth. He further argues that there is need for
more research on different circumstances that obstruct or promote spillovers.
Blomström and Kokko (2003) conclude from their review of the literature that
spillovers are not automatic since local conditions have an important effect in
influencing firms’ adoption of foreign technologies and skills.
Among these local conditions, Alfaro et al. (2004) examine the intermediary





 In particular, we argued that the lack of development of local
financial markets can limit the economy’s ability to take advantage of potential
FDI spillovers. In this paper, we investigate whether this effect operates through
factor accumulation and/or improvements in total factor productivity (TFP).
Given the recent findings in the growth literature that show the important role of
TFP over factor endowments in explaining cross-country income differences, we
think this investigation is an important step in the right direction. We find that capital
accumulation, both physical and human, does not seem to be the main channel
through which countries benefit from FDI. Instead, we find that countries with well-
developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI via TFP improvements.
The importance of well-functioning financial institutions in economic development
has been recognised and extensively discussed in the literature. Researchers have
shown that well-functioning financial markets, by lowering the costs of conducting
transactions, ensure capital is allocated to the projects that yield the highest




 Furthermore, as McKinnon (1973)
states, the development of capital markets is ‘necessary and sufficient’ to foster
the ‘adoption of best-practice technologies and learning by doing’. In other words,
limited access to credit markets restricts entrepreneurial development. If
entrepreneurship allows greater assimilation and adoption of best technological
practices made available by FDI, then the absence of well-developed financial






 Durham (2004) and Hermes and Lensink (2003) provide further evidence that countries with a




 See among others Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Boyd and Prescott (1986),




 Other ways include the need to borrow funds to take advantage of the new knowledge local firms
need to alter everyday activities and, more generally, reorganise their structure, buy new machines,
and hire new managers and skilled labour. Although some local firms might be able to finance new
requirements with internal financing, the greater the technological-knowledge gap between their
current practices and new technologies, the greater the need for external finance. In most cases,
external finance is restricted to domestic sources. See Alfaro et al. (2004) for further details.
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The empirical evidence on whether international capital mobility, via FDI or
other forms, contributes to growth, however, is mixed. Surveying the literature,
Kose et al. (2006) conclude that the macroeconomic literature does not seem to
find a robust significant effect of financial integration on economic growth.
However, this literature has found that institutions, especially financial
development (threshold effects or more generally the ‘absorptive capacities’),




 In this debate, FDI can play a primary role. That is,
financial opening and the resulting inflows of FDI could lead to an increase in
TFP via knowledge spillovers, technology transfers and the fostering of linkages
with domestic firms, depending on the local conditions. Our analysis suggests
that financial markets seem to play a particularly important role in terms of
allowing countries to reap the benefits of direct inflows of foreign capital
precisely via TFP gains.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: an overview of the literature is
provided in Section 2; data are defined in Section 3; empirical results are discussed
in Section 4; and Section 5 concludes.
 
2. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: 
AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT FINDINGS
 
Owing to the technology and know-how embodied in FDI, alongside the sheer
foreign capital, host economies are expected to potentially benefit from these
investments through knowledge spillovers. These spillovers can occur through
various channels such as technology transfers, introduction of new processes and
managerial skills to the domestic market, where further productivity gains can be
realised via backward and forward linkages between foreign and domestic firms.
Alongside these technological improvements FDI can simply contribute to
capital accumulation. The foreign capital injected into the host economy
could contribute to physical capital formation, while employee training can
contribute to skill development in the country. In other words, FDI can contribute
to the development effort of a country via factor accumulation – physical
and human capital – or via improvements in total factor productivity (TFP).
However, the empirical evidence shows that neither of these benefits can be
presumed.
In terms of capital accumulation, Graham and Krugman (1991), Kindleberger
(1969) and Lipsey (2002) show that investors often fail to fully transfer capital




 See also Mendoza et al. (2007) and Aoki et al. (2007).
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 If foreign firms borrow
heavily from local banks, instead of bringing scarce capital from abroad, they





In terms of the relation between human capital accumulation and FDI, there
is ample anecdotal evidence that multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake
substantial efforts in the education of local workers and that MNEs offer more




 In some cases,
MNEs also enter into training cooperation with local institutions in the host
economy. For example, Intel in Costa Rica and Shell-BP in Nigeria have made
contributions to local universities; in Singapore, the Economic Development




However, in an empirical analysis of a panel of countries, te Velde and Xenogiani
(2007) find that FDI enhances skill development (particularly secondary and
tertiary enrolment) only in countries that are relatively well endowed with skills
to start with.
Finally, in terms of the relation between FDI and productivity, the empirical




 For example, looking at plant-level data in
Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that the net effect of FDI on productivity
is quite small, where FDI raises productivity within plants that receive the




 The industrial organisation literature suggests that firms engage in FDI not because of differences
in the cost of capital but because certain assets are worth more under foreign than local control. If
lower cost of capital were the only advantage a foreign firm had over domestic firms, it would still
remain unexplained why a foreign investor would endure the troubles of operating a firm in a




 See discussion in Feldstein (2000). Harrison and McMillian (2003), for example, find that in the
Ivory Coast, for the period 1974–87, borrowing by foreign firms aggravated domestic firms’ credit
constraints. In contrast, Harrison et al. (2004) find FDI inflows to be associated with a reduction












 The micro empirical literature finds ambiguous results for the effect of FDI on a firm’s productivity.
This literature comes in three waves. Starting with the pioneering work of Caves (1974), the first-
generation papers focus on country case studies and industry-level cross-sectional studies. These
studies find a positive correlation between the productivity of MNEs and average value added per
worker of the domestic firms within the same sector. Most of the second-generation studies, which
use firm-level panel data, find no effect of foreign presence or find negative productivity spillover
effects from the MNEs to the developing country firms; see Aitken and Harrison (1999). The
positive spillover effects are found only for developed countries. Haskel et al. (2002), for example,
find positive spillovers from foreign to local firms in a panel dataset of firms in the UK; Gorg and
Strobl (2002) find that foreign presence reduces exit and encourages entry by domestically owned
firms in the high-tech sector in Ireland. Overall, although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of
technology transfers, the empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers suggests that these cases are
not representative in a broader sample and that local conditions play a role in allowing for these
transfers to materialise. See discussion in Moran (2007).
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Borensztein et al. (1998) and Carkovic and Levine (2005), using cross-country
growth regressions, also provide little evidence that FDI has an exogenous positive
effect on economic growth. Empirical evidence at the micro level remains ambiguous
generally, although consistently more pessimistic for developing countries. Görg
and Greenaway (2004), reviewing the micro evidence on externalities from
foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms and paying particular attention to
panel studies, conclude that the effects are mostly negative.
Why has the evidence of FDI generating positive spillovers been elusive? At
the macro level, the literature finds evidence not of an exogenous positive effect
of FDI on economic growth, but of positive effects conditional on local conditions
and policies, notably: the policy environment (Balasubramanayam et al., 1996);
human capital (Borensztein et al., 1998); local financial markets (Alfaro et al.,
2004, 2006); sector characteristics (Alfaro and Charlton, 2007); sectoral composition
(Aykut and Sayek, 2007); and market structure (Alfaro et al., 2006). But are even
these conditions enough? Can positive effects of FDI be induced by the right
local conditions or, more generally, by the right economic environment? Through
what mechanisms can FDI contribute to positive spillover effects? Many
empirical studies have looked for the presence of externalities without trying to
understand the mechanisms through which they might occur. Their focus has
been on finding indirect evidence of externalities by looking for associations
between, for example, increased presence of MNEs in a country or sector and
productivity improvements in local firms or upstream sectors. Establishing the
robustness of these findings and devising appropriate policy interventions to
maximise FDI externalities necessitate investigation of these mechanisms.
Based on these negative results, a recent generation of studies argues that since
multinationals would like to prevent information leakage to potential local
competitors, but would benefit from knowledge spillovers to their local suppliers,
FDI spillovers ought to be between different industries. Hence, one must look
for vertical (inter-industry) externalities instead of horizontal (intra-industry)
externalities. This means the externalities from FDI will manifest themselves
through forward or backward linkages, i.e. contacts between domestic suppliers
of intermediate inputs and their multinational clients in downstream sectors
(backward linkage) or between foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs and their
domestic clients in upstream sectors (forward linkage). Indeed, in recent years, a
new group of papers has explored the existence of positive externalities from FDI
towards local firms in upstream industries (suppliers) with more encouraging
results. Papers by Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2008), exploring the
extent of positive externalities from FDI to local firms in upstream industries
(suppliers), have made an important contribution to the literature in this respect.
Javorcik (2004) and Alfaro and Rodríguez (2004), for example, find evidence for
the existence of linkages between domestic firms and MNEs in Lithuania and in
Venezuela, Chile and Brazil, respectively.
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In contrast to what has sometimes been implied in the empirical literature on
FDI externalities, a positive backward linkage effect does not necessarily imply
a positive externality from MNEs to suppliers (Alfaro and Rodríguez, 2004). In
fact, such a positive linkage effect should lead to a positive externality from




That the empirical literature finds precisely the opposite, a negative or zero horizontal
externality and a positive vertical externality, is puzzling.
Why do we not observe a positive externality from MNEs to other firms in the
same industry? Quality of data, measurement errors in productivity, and endogeneity
issues in the presence of multinationals are all possible answers. Another possible
answer to this puzzle is that there might be some negative horizontal externality
that offsets the positive effect MNEs might otherwise have on other firms in the
same industry consequent on increases in the variety (or even quality) of domestic
inputs precipitated by, for example, the competition effect occasioned by the
entry of MNEs (as argued by Aitken and Harrison, 1999), or MNEs’ pirating of




 But as mentioned, another is that not all





 More generally, as mentioned, several recent FDI studies have investigated
how national characteristics might affect host countries’ capacity to benefit from
FDI, the so-called absorptive capacities. These studies postulate that the size of
spillovers from foreign firms depends on the domestic firms’ ability to respond




 An obvious follow-up question is whether all vertical linkage relations imply positive FDI
spillovers, and what is the nature of these spillovers. The cherry-picking behaviour of many foreign
firms with respect to local firms that can already supply goods (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005) is
not necessarily associated with potential positive externalities. That foreign firms seem also to help
some suppliers improve their performance again implies an externality only if these benefits are
not fully internalised by the firm. Surveys administered to suppliers and MNEs in Costa Rica
revealed few cases in which there had clearly been a positive technology transfer from an MNE to
suppliers (see Alfaro and Rodríguez, 2004). The interviews also revealed that MNEs often lack
technical knowledge about the production processes of the inputs they use. When they do have
such knowledge, it tends to be about production processes for sophisticated inputs that, because
they are unlikely to be supplied by local firms, are usually sourced from highly specialised
international suppliers. Instead of examples of knowledge spillovers via technology transfers, the
interviews revealed many instances in which local firms had decided to upgrade the quality of their




 An important challenge for the literature is to control for competition effects. Data availability
imposes a significant restriction on efforts to address this issue through econometric work, particularly
in developing countries. In some recent work, Alfaro et al. (2006) combine theory and a calibration
approach to formalise the mechanism through which the trickle-down effect of FDI via backward
linkages depends on the extent of local conditions: market structure, financial markets, competition





 Javorcik and Spatareanu’s (2007) study shows that less liquidity constrained firms become MNE
suppliers – underscoring the importance of well-developed financial markets for allowing firms to
fully reap the benefits associated with FDI inflows.
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firms’ success is, to some extent, determined by local characteristics such as the
domestic level of human capital and the overall institutional level of the country.
Weaknesses in these areas may reduce the capacity of domestic industries to
absorb new technologies and to respond to the challenges and opportunities
presented by foreign entrants. Variation in absorptive capacities between countries
(and industries within countries) is a promising line of research because it offers
a potentially appealing synthesis of the conflicting results that have emerged
from the literature. We have stressed the role of financial markets, and in what
follows we explore the role its development plays in enhancing the relation






The Appendix describes in detail the data used in the empirical analysis. In
this section, data for the three most significant variables are discussed: the
measures of foreign direct investment, financial market development and total
factor productivity (TFP) growth rate.
An important source for the FDI data is the IMF publication ‘International
Financial Statistics’ (IFS), which reports the balance of payments statistics on
FDI. The net FDI inflows reported in the IFS measure the net inflows of investment
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in
an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and
short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. The gross FDI figures
reflect the sum of the absolute values of inflows, excluding the possible outflow
of previous foreign investments. Our model focuses on the inflows to the econ-
omy; therefore, we prefer to use the net inflow measure. Alternative data sources
include UNCTAD and OECD publications; however, the IMF data allow a more




 Alfaro et al. (2006) formalise the mechanism through which FDI leads to a higher growth rate
in the host country via backward linkages. This result is consistent with the micro evidence found
by recent studies that argue that, since multinationals would like to prevent information leakage to
potential local competitors, but would benefit from knowledge spillovers to their local suppliers,
FDI spillovers ought to be between different industries. Hence, one must look for vertical (inter-
industry) externalities instead of horizontal (intra-industry) externalities. This means the externalities
from FDI will manifest themselves through forward or backward linkages, i.e. contacts between
domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and their multinational clients in downstream sectors
(backward linkage) or between foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs and their domestic clients
in upstream sectors (forward linkage). These results are consistent with FDI spillovers between
different industries. The mechanism in Alfaro et al. (2006) depends on the extent of the development
of the local financial sector. Financial markets act as a channel for the linkage effect to be realised
and create positive spillovers. This channel is also consistent with the macro literature cited above
that shows the importance of absorptive capacities.
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Following King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Levine
et al. (2000), we construct several financial market series, including the share of
liquid liabilities in the overall economic activity level, a measure reflecting the
asset structure of the banking sector and the share of private sector credit in GDP.
We draw on variables introduced by Levine et al. (2000), which in turn build on
King and Levine (1993a). The data associated with the former are available from
the World Bank Financial Structure Database. Specifically, three variables are








) equal currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and
non-financial intermediaries divided by GDP. It is the broadest measure of
financial intermediation and includes three types of financial institutions: the




provides a measure for the overall size of the financial sector without distinguishing





) equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by




 measures the degree to which
commercial banks rather than the central bank allocate society’s savings. King
and Levine (1993a) and Levine et al. (2000), as well as others, have used this
measure, which provides a relative size indicator, i.e. the importance of the different





) equals credits by deposit money banks to the private
sector as a share of GDP (it does not include non-bank credits to the private
sector). The two previous measures do not differentiate between the end users of





 The number of countries for which we have these financial
market variables and FDI shares is 72.
While the first set of regressions aim at identifying the relationship between
growth, financial markets and FDI, we further investigate the channels of such
growth effects. The issue of whether FDI affects growth through the total factor
productivity or factor accumulation, and the role financial markets play in
channelling these effects, requires the use of TFP growth rates as a dependent
variable. The TFP growth rate data are obtained from Bernanke and Gurkaynak
(2001), where the latest data are available for the period 1975–95. As such,
although the remaining data are available for a longer time period, we limit the
















 While the analysis is replicated using all four alternative financial market measures, we only
report those using the credit-related indicators of financial market depth for which we have data




 The URL for the latest data from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) is http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/
refet/research.html.
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of the TFP data allows the inclusion of 62 countries in the regressions where TFP
is the dependent variable. These countries are listed in the Appendix. The TFP
measure used in the regressions uses the imputations from Bernanke and Gurkaynak
(2001) where the labour share is assumed constant at 65 per cent across all
countries. We prefer this measure to the alternative where the actual labour
share is used for each country given the reduced sample size available with this
alternative measure. Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) provide TFP calculations
for two alternative assumptions regarding the return to education, respectively
0 per cent and 7 per cent. The analysis is conducted for both measures;
however, given the similarity in results, we report only those for the TFP calculated
using a constant share of labour across countries and 7 per cent return to education.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for investment, growth and financial
development data, as well as the TFP growth rate data. There is considerable










4 per cent for Guyana to 7 per cent for Korea. The financial
development variables also range extensively: the log of liquid liabilities as a




1.86 per cent for Peru to 0.48 per cent for Japan, the
TABLE 1
Summary Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Sample 1: 72 countries (1975–95)
Growth rate 0.01 0.02 −0.04 0.07
FDI/GDP 0.01 0.01 −0.00 0.04
LLY/GD −0.89 0.55 −1.86 0.48
BTOT −0.30 0.31 −1.30 −0.01
BANKCR −1.32 0.73 −3.39 0.32
PRIVO −1.10 0.79 −3.39 0.50
Investment/GDP 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.41
Sample 2: 62 countries (1975–95)
TFP growth rate 0.00 0.01 −0.04 0.02
FDI/GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
LLY/GDP −0.89 0.53 −1.86 0.48
BTOT −0.25 0.24 −1.30 −0.01
BANKCR −1.28 0.70 −3.39 0.32
PRIVO −1.03 0.75 −3.39 0.50
Investment/GDP 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.38
Notes:
Data descriptions are provided in the Appendix and data section. Note, the financial market indicators are
logged, as they are used in this transformation in the relevant regressions. Sample 1 refers to the countries used
in the regressions where the growth rate or the investment/GDP ratio are the dependent variable, while sample 2
refers to the countries used in the regressions where the TFP growth rate is the dependent variable. See the
Appendix for a detailed description of the variables.
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4 per cent for Nicaragua to 3 per cent for Thailand. Table 2 shows




The purpose of our empirical analysis is to examine whether the financial
markets channel through which FDI is beneficial for growth operates through
factor accumulation or TFP. We will adopt a simple OLS cross-country strategy
to establish the basic patterns in the data. The pros and cons of this strategy will
be discussed in the next section. As a first step, we assess whether the level of
financial development in the host country affects the relationship between FDI
and growth. Then, we ask whether the effects of FDI are through factor accumulation
– both physical and human capital – or via TFP. The importance of well-functioning
financial institutions in augmenting technological innovation, capital accumula-





 By lowering the costs of conducting transactions, well-
functioning financial markets ensure capital is allocated to the projects that yield
the highest returns and therefore enhance growth rates. There are several plausible
reasons to expect that financial markets might complement the spillover effects
of FDI. First, the successful acquisition of new technologies introduced by foreign
firms will generally involve a process of reorganisation and reinvestment by their
domestic competitors. To the extent that this process is externally financed from
domestic sources, efficient financial markets will enhance the competitive




 See King and Levine (1993a,b) and Beck et al. (2000).
TABLE 2









Productivity 1.00 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Growth 0.84 1.00 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Investment 0.17 0.47 1.00 ... ... ... ... ...
FDI 0.02 0.14 0.02 1.00 ... ... ... ...
PRIVO 0.34 0.39 0.26 0.08 1.00 ... ... ...
BANKCR 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.08 0.94 1.00 ... ...
Schooling 0.37 0.40 0.08 0.10 0.60 0.52 1.00 ...
Institutions 0.51 0.46 0.16 0.18 0.77 0.73 0.69 1.00
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other domestic firms and entrepreneurs to capitalise on linkages with new
multinationals (see Alfaro et al., 2006).
In a cross-country analysis, Alfaro et al. (2004) find that countries with well-
developed financial markets benefit significantly more from FDI than countries
with weaker markets. The authors find no direct effect of FDI on growth, but
they find consistently significant results when FDI is combined in an interaction
term with a range of measures of financial development. Before we explore the
channels through which these effects take place, we first re-establish our results
for the whole sample, whose time period is limited by TFP data.
Regressions in Table 3 examine the role of FDI on growth through financial
markets. We interact FDI with financial markets and use this as a regressor. To
ensure that the interaction term does not proxy for FDI or the level of development
of financial markets, both of the latter variables were also independently included
in the regression. Thus, we run the following regression:20
20 Note that the variables in the interaction term are demeaned to avoid conflicting interpretations.
TABLE 3









Initial GDP −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012
[3.88]*** [3.86]*** [3.87]*** [3.77]*** [3.81]***
FDI/GDP −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.26 −0.27
[0.22] [0.21] [0.19] [1.09] [1.11]
Human capital 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[2.62]** [2.49]** [2.62]** [2.15]** [2.49]**
Institutional quality 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
[2.61]** [2.46]** [2.53]** [2.47]** [2.46]**
Financial market ... 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005
... [0.55] [0.43] [1.27] [1.20] 
(FDI/GDP) * Financial market ... ... ... 0.78 0.89
... ... ... [2.72]*** [2.91]***
Constant 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
[2.06]** [2.09]** [2.08]** [2.36]** [2.41]**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.64
Notes:
Dependent variable is average growth rate of real GDP per capita. Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial market depth is measured by private
credit extended by deposit banks as a share of GDP in columns 2 and 4, while in columns 3 and 5, it is
measured as the share of private credit by the whole financial system as a share of GDP. Controls include a
subset of population growth rate, black market premium, inflation, trade, government consumption and Sub-
Saharan Africa dummy in each column.
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(1)
where X stands for the vector of control variables that include initial income,
human capital, population growth, government consumption, institutional quality
and sub-Saharan Africa, inflation and trade. Results of the most basic regression
are provided in column (1) of Table 3.21 In columns (2) and (3), we add financial
market indicators, in (2) private credit extended by deposit banks and (3) share
of private credit by the whole of the financial system.22 In columns (2) and (3),
we present results with no interaction term. As seen in the table, FDI is not
significant in columns (1) to (3). These results summarise the findings in the
literature: FDI does not exert a robust positive impact on growth. This ambiguous
effect of FDI and the role of local conditions has been the motivation for this
ongoing research.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, we include the interaction term which turns
out to be positive and significant at 1 per cent for the different financial sector
variables. To get an estimate of how important the financial sector has been in
enhancing the growth effects of FDI, one can ask the hypothetical question of
how much a one standard deviation increase in the financial development varia-
ble would enhance the growth rate of a country receiving the mean level of FDI
in the sample.23 If we use the private credit variable (i.e. column (4)), it turns out
that having better financial markets would have allowed countries to experience
an annual growth rate increase of 0.64 percentage points.
Table 4 presents results for an expanded set of controls that include domestic
investment and interactions with institutions, respectively. The strong positive
correlation between the domestic investment ratio and the growth rate of an
economy is one of the few consistent results to have emerged from the multitude
of cross-country growth regressions that have appeared in the past decade. One
could argue that the reason FDI appears significant in the above analysis is
because the domestic investment ratio was not controlled for (albeit FDI is a
small component of total investment for most countries in the sample). Therefore,
for further robustness checks, we add domestic investment to the list of
independent variables. The results are reported in columns (1)–(4) of Table 4. As
expected, domestic investment enters significantly in all the regressions, but our
results remain robust. We present results using the share of private credit by the
whole financial system as a share of GDP for the sake of brevity, but similar results
are obtained with other measures. Another concern is that our financial market
21 See the data section for detailed definitions.
22 We also used stock market development, obtaining similar results.
23 The mean value for FDI is 1.003 per cent in the 72-country sample. Note that the financial
development variable here is the log of the financial market indicator.
GROWTH FDI GDP FINANCE
FDI GDP FINANCE
i i i
i i i i
    ( / )  ( )
  ( /  * )    ,
= + +
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variable may be proxying for the overall institutional quality level of the country.
Columns (3) and (4) show our results to be robust to controlling for institutional
quality and the interaction of FDI with institutional quality. Repeating the above
hypothetical example, results in Table 4 suggest that a one standard deviation
increase in the financial development variable would enhance the growth rate of
a country receiving the mean level of FDI in the sample by approximately 0.8
percentage points over a 20-year period.
The macro literature has emphasised the dependence of productivity spillovers
on the absorptive capacity of the local economy, with specific reference to human
capital, financial development and openness. The importance of human capital
presumably relates to the ability of a highly skilled domestic workforce to adopt
advanced technology. If the transfer of new technology and skills is one of the
beneficial effects of FDI, we might expect the relationship between industry growth
rate and FDI’s levels to be stronger in industries that are highly skill dependent.
TABLE 4
Economic Growth, FDI and Financial Markets (1975–95): Other Interactions and Investment
1 2 3 4 5
Initial GDP −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
[3.76]*** [3.57]*** [4.50]*** [3.74]*** [3.95]***
FDI/GDP −0.07 −0.32 −0.17 −0.28 −0.24
[0.23] [1.37] [0.60] [1.06] [1.02]
Human capital 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[2.36]** [1.98]* [2.30]** [2.12]** [2.29]**
Investment 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
[2.33]** [3.42]*** [2.39]** [2.38]** [2.55]**
Institutions (Inst.) 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006
[2.64]** [2.64]** [3.62]*** [3.36]*** [3.51]***
Financial market (FMD) 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.006
[0.07] [0.95] [0.83] [1.73]* [1.58]
(FDI/GDP) * FMD ... 1.08 ... 1.04 1.23
... [3.60]*** ... [2.36]** [3.27]***
(FDI/GDP) * Inst. ... ... 0.24 −0.04 ...
... ... [1.41] [0.22] ...
(FDI/GDP) * HK ... ... ... ... −0.42
... ... ... ... [1.41]
Constant 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.02
[1.07] [1.22] [2.34]** [2.00]* [0.71]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.64 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.65
Notes:
Dependent variable is average growth rate of real GDP per capita. Robust t-statistics in brackets. * Significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial market depth is measured by the BANKCR
indicators in all columns. Controls include a subset of population growth rate, black market premium, inflation,
trade, government consumption and Sub-Saharan Africa dummy in each column.
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In Table 4, we look at the interaction of FDI with human capital since this
term is shown to have a significant positive effect on economic growth in earlier
research.24 Column (5) reports the main results. While FDI and schooling both
register significant effects, the interaction between the two does not. Contrary to
previous findings, the interaction term is not significant. However, we are using
a different human capital variable for a slightly different time period, and therefore
our result may not be comparable with previous findings. The interaction
between FDI and financial markets remains robust.
a. Factors or TFP?
In Table 5, we present results of the following regression:
(2)
where INVi corresponds to the ratio of domestic investment to GDP, and the rest
of the variables are as before.
Column (1) considers the role of financial market development using private
credit by deposit banks as the measure. The variable has a positive and significant
effect on capital accumulation. FDI does not have a significant effect. We con-
sider the interaction term in column (2), in which it appears not to be significant.
In columns (3) and (4), we consider private credit to the whole financial system
which also appears not to be significant. FDI is not significant either. Similar
results are obtained when we consider the role of human capital in columns (5)
and (6). Our results hold when considering the role of overall institutional devel-
opment as seen in columns (7) and (8).25 The main lesson from these regressions
is that if FDI has an effect on growth, it does not seem to operate via capital
accumulation even when we consider threshold and interaction effects with the
absorptive capacities of the economy.
In an effort to further study FDI’s role in inducing additional factor accumu-
lation in the host country, we further study the above equation using human
capital as the dependent variable. Therefore, the following regression is run:
(3)
24 See Borensztein et al. (1998) and Xu (2000).
25 In terms of the interaction between FDI and proxies for institutional quality (bureaucratic
quality), the negative and significant effect is consistent with findings by Gorodnichenko et al.
(2006) for a sample of emerging markets.
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Domestic Investment, FDI and Financial Markets (1975–95)
Dependent Variable: Domestic Investment, 1975–95
PRIVO BANKCR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial GDP −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
[1.69]* [1.72]* [1.50] [1.53] [1.64] [1.66] [1.16] [1.08]
FDI/GDP 0.08 0.49 0.13 0.59 0.18 0.44 0.62 0.56
[0.08] [0.44] [0.13] [0.51] [0.16] [0.38] [0.58] [0.53]
Human capital 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[1.08] [1.15] [1.47] [1.49] [1.26] [1.23] [1.15] [1.12]
Institutional quality 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 −0.001 −0.002
[0.05] [0.03] [0.25] [0.31] [0.13] [0.37] [0.17] [0.23]
FMD 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
[2.19]** [1.64] [1.14] [0.72] [1.67] [1.00] [1.77]* [1.92]*
(FDI/GDP) * FMD ... −1.59 ... −1.96 ... −2.40 ... 0.58
... [1.19] ... [1.19] ... [1.07] ... [0.46]
(FDI/GDP) * HK ... ... ... ... −0.36 0.90 ... ...
... ... ... ... [0.30] [0.51] ... ...
(FDI/GDP) * Inst. ... ... ... ... ... ... −1.10 −1.25
... ... ... ... ... ... [1.91]* [1.95]*
Constant 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.30
[2.72]*** [2.98]*** [2.37]** [2.66]** [2.26]** [2.62]** [2.94]*** [2.85]***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.28
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial market depth is measured by private credit extended by deposit
banks as a share of GDP in columns 2 and 3, while in the remaining columns it is measured as the share of private credit by the whole financial system as a share of
GDP. Controls include a subset of population growth rate, black market premium, inflation, trade, government consumption and Sub-Saharan Africa dummy in each
column.
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Results reported in Table 6 suggest that, similar to its effect on physical
capital, FDI plays no significant role in inducing human capital accumulation
either. This result holds regardless of the alternative absorptive capacities that
are tested for, including the depth of local financial markets and institutional
quality.
Finally, Table 7 considers similar analysis using TFP growth as dependent
variable. In particular we run,
(4)
where TFPgrowthi corresponds to the growth rate of the TFP calculated using
a constant labour share, imputations following Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001).
Columns (1) and (2) show FDI not to have an exogenous effect on TFP. How-
ever, we obtain positive and significant results once we consider the interaction
of FDI with the level of development of the financial market. This result holds
for both alternative measures of financial market development, i.e. when we use
private credit by deposit banks, in column (2), and private credit by the whole
financial system, in column (4). Once again, a hypothetical exercise of imputing
the TFP growth effects of a one standard deviation improvement in the financial
market indicator for a country receiving the mean level of FDI suggests the TFP
growth rate will increase by approximately 0.50 percentage points over a 20-year
period. In column (5), we obtain that the result is robust to considering human
capital interactions; in column (6), we show the same for the case of the interaction
with institutional development. These results are consistent with the mechanism
advanced in Alfaro et al. (2006). In a theoretical framework, the authors formalise
the mechanism through which FDI leads to a higher growth rate in the host
country via backward linkages, which is consistent with the micro evidence.
The mechanism depends on the extent of the development of the local
financial sector. Financial markets act as a channel for the linkage effect to be
realised and create positive spillovers. The model is a small open economy where
final goods production is carried out by foreign and domestic firms, which
compete for skilled labour, unskilled labour and intermediate products. To
operate a firm in the intermediate goods sector, entrepreneurs must develop a
new variety of intermediate good, a task that requires upfront capital investments.
The more developed the local financial markets, the easier it is for credit-
constrained entrepreneurs to start their own firms. The increase in the number of
varieties of intermediate goods leads to positive spillovers to the final goods
sector. As a result, financial markets allow the backward linkages between
foreign and domestic firms to turn into FDI spillovers. These spillovers imply
positive efficiency effects.
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Human Capital, FDI and Financial Markets (1975–95)
Dependent Variable: Human Capital, 1975–95
PRIVO BANKCR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial GDP 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28
[3.51]*** [3.55]*** [3.66]*** [3.70]*** [3.79]*** [3.79]*** [3.84]*** [3.75]***
FDI/GDP −4.85 −6.46 −3.91 −5.24 −5.00 −5.81 −4.02 −4.99
[0.76] [0.85] [0.61] [0.70] [0.77] [0.77] [0.62] [0.66]
Institutions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.03] [0.24] [0.22] [0.44] [0.35]
FMD 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.05
[1.63] [1.63] [1.29] [1.39] [0.62] [0.66] [0.27] [0.47]
(FDI/GDP) * FMD ... 6.39 ... 10.46 ... 3.52 ... 9.10
... [0.70] ... [0.75] ... [0.37] ... [0.54]
(FDI/GDP) * Inst. ... ... −0.92 −3.64 ... ... −1.29 −3.67
... ... [0.30] [0.67] ... ... [0.43] [0.61]
Constant −0.22 −0.17 −0.46 −0.52 −0.45 −0.42 −0.52 −0.58
[0.27] [0.20] [0.57] [0.64] [0.58] [0.53] [0.63] [0.68]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial market depth is measured by private credit extended by deposit
banks as a share of GDP in columns 2 and 3, while in the remaining columns it is measured as the share of private credit by the whole financial system as a share of






































Total Factor Productivity (TFP), FDI and Financial Markets (1975–95)
Dependent Variable: TFP Growth Rate, 1975–95
PRIVO BANKCR
1 2 3 4 5 6
Initial GDP −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
[3.11]*** [2.65]** [3.31]*** [2.97]*** [3.15]*** [3.07]***
FDI/GDP −0.28 −0.51 −0.28 −0.52 −0.41 −0.34
[1.24] [3.08]*** [1.23] [2.79]*** [2.19]** [1.82]*
Human capital 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
[1.65] [1.20] [1.47] [0.96] [1.06] [1.15]
Institutional quality 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
[3.83]*** [3.52]*** [3.88]*** [2.89]*** [4.41]*** [3.96]***
Financial markets −0.004 −0.002 −0.005 −0.002 0.000 0.000
[1.09] [0.56] [1.26] [0.79] [0.11] [0.11]
FDI/GDP * FMD ... 0.73 ... 0.83 0.74 1.07
... [2.91]*** ... [2.76]*** [2.22]** [3.56]***
FDI/GDP * HK ... ... ... ... −0.17 ...
... ... ... ... [0.73] ...
FDI/GDP * Inst. ... ... ... ... ... −0.27
... ... ... ... ... [2.42]**
Constant 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06
[1.01] [0.97] [1.37] [1.28] [0.72] [2.56]**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
R2 0.51 0.58 0.52 0.58 0.49 0.52
Notes:
Robust t-statistics in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Financial market depth is measured by private credit extended by deposit
banks as a share of GDP in columns 1 and 2, while in the remaining columns it is measured as the share of private credit by the whole financial system per GDP.
Controls include a subset of population growth rate, black market premium, inflation, trade, government consumption and Sub-Saharan Africa dummy in each column.
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b. Discussion on Identification
We are well aware that the correlations we have shown so far are the ‘proximate
determinants’ of output growth, TFP growth, and factors as opposed to ‘causal’
determinants.26 An important concern in the FDI–growth literature is that growth
may itself spawn more FDI. Alternatively, some third variable might affect a
country’s growth trajectory and, thereby, its attractiveness to foreign capital. In
these cases, the coefficients on the estimates are likely to overstate the positive
impact of foreign investment. Both theoretically and empirically, it is plausible,
and also very likely, that both the magnitude of FDI and the efficiency of
financial markets increase with higher growth rates. This is a tough issue to deal
with and almost impossible to resolve without good instruments.
We prefer to adopt a less ambitious strategy and show a falsification exercise
in Table 8. We switch the places of our independent and dependent variables and
regress FDI on growth. It is clear that there is no significant relationship of growth
on FDI. This shows that as a first cut reverse causality may not be of major
concern for our sample. As far as omitted variables go, we did utilise a wide
range of controls and hence we worry less about this issue.
At the micro level, other researchers did find causal but indirect effects. Javorcik
and Spatareanu (2007) find that Czech firms supplying multinationals tend to be
less liquidity constrained than other firms. The relationship and causality between
facing financing constraints and supplying MNEs may go both ways. If firms
need some investment in order to become suppliers to MNEs, then the causality
goes from better development financial markets to allowing MNEs’ benefits to
materialise. However, it is also possible, as the authors note, that receiving a
contract from an MNE improves the creditworthiness of suppliers, allowing them
to obtain outside lending. The authors find, however, after a careful examination
of the timing of the phenomenon, that this result is the result of the self-selection
of less liquidity-constrained firms into supplying relationships. This evidence
further suggests that in the absence of well-functioning financial markets, local
firms may find it difficult to start business relations with MNEs and reap benefits
of productivity spillovers. This mechanism is consistent with the formalisation in
Alfaro et al. (2006), and the empirical evidence revealed in this paper that benefits
seem to go via TFP and not capital accumulation. Hoxa et al. (2007) use micro-
estimates of FDI on firm-level productivity and growth accounting and find that
the efficiency effect FDI can account for approximately 12 per cent of total variation
in log of GDP per capita across countries in the 1990s. Alfaro and Charlton (2007)
provide industry-level evidence by using data for OECD countries at the industry
level and show that the relation between FDI at the industry level and growth is
26 Prasad et al. (2007), also focusing on correlations, find that in countries with weaker financial





































Falsification: FDI, Growth and Factor Accumulation (1975–95)
Dependent Variable: FDI as a Share of GDP, 1975–95
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Growth rate 0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 0.09 ... 0.11 ...
[0.08] [0.18] [0.26] [0.23] [0.23] [0.63] ... [0.81] ...
Schooling 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 −0.0019 −0.0018 −0.0026 ... ... −0.0029
[0.07] [0.01] [0.11] [0.73] [0.71] [1.14] ... ... [1.50]
SSA dummy −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
[2.33]** [2.48]** [2.46]** [3.14]*** [3.24]*** [2.58]** [3.49]*** [2.07]** [4.24]***
Institutions 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
[0.92] [0.69] [0.64] [0.55] [0.69] [2.29]** [2.17]** [2.23]** [2.64]**
Trade ... ... ... 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
... ... ... [4.87]*** [4.40]*** [3.05]*** [3.32]*** [3.03]*** [3.36]***
Financial markets ... ... ... ... −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
... ... ... ... [0.61] [0.84] [0.78] [0.86] [0.76]
Productivity ... ... ... ... ... −0.27 −0.16 −0.29 −0.15
... ... ... ... ... [1.37] [1.26] [1.38] [1.22]
Constant 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
[1.43] [1.56] [1.55] [0.81] [0.78] [0.23] [0.77] [0.55] [0.55]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 4 Set 4 Set 5 Set 5 Set 5
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 62 62 62 62
R2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.40
Notes:
Set 1 of control variables includes initial GDP, population growth rate and government spending. Set 2 adds the black market premium to set 1, set 3 adds inflation
to set 2, set 4 adds investment to set 3, and finally set 5 excludes initial GDP from set 4. Robust statistics are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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stronger for industries more reliant on external finance. These results, apart from
being consistent with the existing macro literature and hypothesised benefits of
FDI, are further evidence of important cross-industry differences in the effects of FDI.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the effect of FDI on growth via financial markets
by investigating whether this effect operates through factor accumulation and/or
improvements in TFP. Factor accumulation – physical and human capital – does
not seem to be the main channel through which countries benefit from FDI. Instead,
we find that countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly
from FDI via TFP improvements. These results are consistent with the recent
findings in the growth literature that show the important role of TFP over factors
in explaining cross-country income differences. The caveat is that our results are
interpretable as the ‘proximate determinants’ of output growth, TFP growth, and
factors as opposed to ‘causal’ determinants. We undertake a simple falsification
exercise to show that reverse causality is not a major concern for our sample.
What are some sensible policy implications from the research to date? FDI can
play an important role in economic growth, most likely via enhancement of
efficiency rather than by capital accumulation, but local conditions matter and
can limit the extent to which FDI benefits materialise. It is not clear that incen-
tives to MNEs are warranted. More prudent policies might involve eliminating
barriers that prevent local firms from establishing adequate linkages, improving
local firms’ access to inputs, technology and financing, and streamlining the
procedures associated with selling inputs. But we might also seek to improve
domestic conditions, which should have the dual effect of attracting foreign
investment (Alfaro et al., 2008) and enabling host economies to maximise the
benefits of such foreign investment.
APPENDIX
a. Countries in the Samples
1. Sample of 72 countries for which data on credit markets are available
(BANKCR, BTOT, PRIVCR, LLY ).
2. Sample of 62 countries for which data on TFP growth rates are available.
b. List of Countries
Algeria (1,2), Argentina (1,2), Australia (1,2), Austria (1,2), Belgium (1,2),
Bolivia (1), Brazil (1,2), Cameroon (1,2), Canada (1,2), Chile (1,2), Colombia
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(1,2), Congo (1,2), Costa Rica (1,2), Cyprus (1), Denmark (1,2), Dominican
Republic (1,2), Ecuador (1,2), Egypt (1,2), El Salvador (1,2), Finland (1,2),
France (1,2), Gambia (1), Germany (1), Ghana (1,2), Greece (1,2), Guatemala
(1,2), Guyana (1), Haiti (1), Honduras (1,2), India (1,2), Indonesia (1,2), Iran (1),
Ireland (1,2), Israel (1,2), Italy (1,2), Jamaica (1,2), Japan (1,2), Kenya (1,2),
Korea (1,2), Malta (1), Malawi (1,2), Malaysia (1,2), Mexico (1,2), Netherlands
(1,2), New Zealand (1,2), Nicaragua (1,2), Niger (1,2), Norway (1,2), Pakistan
(1,2), Panama (1,2), Papua New Guinea (1,2), Paraguay (1,2), Peru (1,2), Philippines
(1,2), Portugal (1,2), Senegal (1,2), Sierra Leone (1), South Africa (1,2), Spain
(1,2), Sri Lanka (1,2), Sudan (1), Sweden (1,2), Switzerland (1,2), Syria (1,2),
Thailand (1,2), Togo (1,2), Trinidad & Tobago (1,2), United Kingdom (1,2),
United States (1,2), Uruguay (1,2), Venezuela (1,2), Zimbabwe (1,2).
c. Data Sources and Descriptions
Foreign direct investment: The net FDI inflows measure the net inflows of
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the
investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term
capital and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Source: IMF
International Financial Statistics.
Output levels and growth: Output level and growth data is the growth of real
per capita GDP, constant dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI),
World Bank (2000).
TFP growth rate: Growth in total factor productivity from Bernanke and
Gurkaynak (2001).
Liquidity (LLY): Liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of the financial intermediaries and non-
bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. Source: World Bank Financial
Structure Database.
Private credit (PRIVCR): The value of credits by financial intermediaries to
the private sector divided by GDP. It excludes credit issued by central and development
banks. Furthermore, it excludes credit to the public sector and cross-claims of one
group of intermediaries on another. Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database.
Bank credit (BANKCR): Credit by deposit money banks to the private sector
as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database.
Commercial–central bank (BTOT): Ratio of commercial bank domestic assets
divided by central bank plus commercial bank domestic assets. Source: World
Bank Financial Structure Database.
Domestic investment: ‘Gross domestic investment’ measuring the outlays on
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of
inventories. Source: World Bank (2000).
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Inflation: Percentage changes in the GDP deflator. Source: World Bank (2000).
Government consumption: Total expenditure of the central government as a
share of GDP. It includes both current and capital (development) expenditures
and excludes lending minus repayments. Source: World Bank (2000).
Trade volume: Exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank (2000).
Schooling: Human capital measured as the average years of secondary school-
ing in total population. Source: Barro and Lee (1996). Updated version down-
loadable from: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.
Bureaucratic quality: The institutional strength of the economy. High levels
of quality imply that the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern
without drastic changes in policy, or interruption to public services. Source:
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Risk of expropriation: The probability that the government may expropriate
private property. Source: ICRG.
Black market premium: This is calculated as the premium in the parallel
exchange market relative to the official market (i.e. the formula is (parallel
exchange rate/official exchange rate − 1) * 100). The values for industrial countries
are added as zero. Source: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/research/
growth/GDNdata.htm).
Real effective exchange rate: Calculated as the ratio of local price index to the
multiplication of the US price index and the official exchange rate. Source:
World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm).
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